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The Ecological Economics Program (EEP) was established in CRES as the result of a successful 
application to the Institute of Advanced Studies 1994 Strategic Initiatives round. EEP's objective 
is to promote the development of ecological economics by conducting research and acting as a 
focal point for ecological economics activities in the Canberra region. To this end, EEP: 
 
• hosts the office of ANZSEE, the Australia New Zealand Society for Ecological Economics   
• runs a seminar series  
• runs a working paper series on the World Wide Web 
• can serve as a host for individuals wishing to do ecological economics research as visitors 
to the ANU (Contact Mick Common for more information). 
• supervises research students. People interested in doing a research degree in ecological 
economics should contact Mick Common or David Stern for more information. 
 
The working paper series reports on research conducted in EEP by academic staff, visitors, and 
students, and invited seminar presenters. 
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Bioprospecting and Biodiversity Contracts 
 
An economic model for a biodiversity prospecting contract, between a developing 
country  and a pharmaceutical company is developed. The theoretical model is compared 
with observed contracts and those being developed by biodiversity expects. It is found 
that these contracts roughly reflect the character of the economic model, although due to 
asymmetric information and risk aversion, the contracts are often second-best. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Bioprospecting refers to the search for new in situ sources of chemical 
compounds, genes, proteins, microorganisms for pharmaceutical and other products of 
potential economic value.  Much of the biodiversity on our planet is found in situ in 
locations that lack effective property rights.  Only recently have the countries containing 
large amount of biodiversity come to recognize the potential returns that may be lost to 
them without an institutional mechanism to control access to this resource.  
 
Establishing control over access to in situ biodiversity does not guarantee a return. 
Due to the uncertainties associated with open access in situ storage, much material and 
information has already been extracted, and is now stored ex situ in gene banks, 
laboratories and botanical gardens outside the source countries. There is currently debate 
over the ownership of the materials in ex situ storage (Frisvold and Condon, 1998).i  The 
return that can be generated by bioprospecting depends upon the rarity of the particular 
material or information, including both in situ and ex situ storage. It also depends upon 
the  relative cost of  a bioprospecting discovery.  If bioprospecting is to yield a return for 
a host country, it must be competitive in a world in which combinatorial chemistry and 
genetic modification can both alter and substitute for the natural source material. ii  
Simpson (1997) has argued that conservationists have overstated the value of 
biodiversity-prospecting. Either because useful products are very common, or so rare as 
to be excessively costly to discover, the values are not so large as conservationists had 
supposed.  The implication is that a sensible approach to bioprospecting would be a 
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systematic one, which uses biological, chemical, medical and indigenous knowledge, to 
direct bioprospecting activity to the locations where it will generate the greatest value. It 
should also be recognized that any return that can be generated by bioprospecting  
constitutes only a portion of the value of biodiversity. Policies to preserve biodiversity 
should not focus narrowly on bioprospecting. 
 
Nevertheless, in situ biodiversity provides a reservoir of robustness, which has 
been, and will continue to be, drawn upon in the search for  new pharmaceutical and 
other products. It is useful to consider institutional mechanisms to ensure that 
biodiversity-prospecting rents are not dissipated, and provide incentives for the 
preservation of biodiversity. Such mechanisms can also be useful for preserving other 
biodiversity values.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop an economic model for a biodiversity-
prospecting contract between a host country and a pharmaceutical company.  The 
economic model will be compared with a legal model and contracts that are being 
observed in this area of emerging property rights. After some background in the next 
section, the economic theory of a contract (with a risk averse collector) will be discussed 
in section III. Ecologists, environmentalists and attorneys have been working together to 
design their own ideal.  The contracts observed today are based upon their theory of what 
a contract should do.  Their theory will be presented and compared with economic theory 
in section IV.   This section will discuss any divergences between the two theories. 
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II BACKGROUND 
 
Biodiversity has historically been treated as a global common property resource. 
While common property resources can often be effectively managed at the local level, it 
is difficult to carry out effective management at the global level. Without an effective 
property rights system, it is possible for foreign bioprospectors are able to take as much 
as they would like from the "unowned" biodiversity, and potentially develop that material 
into pharmaceutical products that yield large profits for them, while returning little gain 
to the source country.   Nor is there an incentive for the developing country to conserve 
or manage these natural resources.  Without enforced property rights, indigenous people 
are unlikely to see any gain from preserving the biodiversity surrounding them.iii 
 
The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Article 1 (1992) 
has formalized the recognition that the preservation of environmental resources is 
intimately linked to the provision of economic incentives for individuals, groups and 
nations.  It has provided support for both the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived 
from genetic resources and the recognition of rights over these resources.   Combined 
with internal legislation exercising the host counties property rights, appropriate 
intellectual property rights (IPR) laws in both the host country and the demand country, 
and resolution of the status of ex situ collections acquired prior to the CBD’s entry into 
force, the biodiversity contract provides a mechanism within which appropriate 
incentives and an equitable distribution of benefits can occur.iv  While the details of the 
contract can vary from country to country, the basic framework will remain.  
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A related benefit of contract development is reduced transaction costs for future 
contractual relationships. Significant transaction costs are involved in negotiating 
contracts between developing country suppliers and corporate demanders.  
Nongovernmental and governmental organizations have taken on the role of 
intermediaries in bioprospecting.  The intermediary may develop and assess projects, 
work in collaboration with the indigenous population to extract and export the samples, 
and/or be responsible for any permits or fees that must be paid to the host country.  The 
intermediary has an increasing expertise that reduces transaction costs, and can be carried 
over to other types of biodiversity contracts (Biglaiser, 1993). 
 
III. THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF THE CONTRACT 
 
A typical example of a contract is a written agreement between a buyer and a 
seller. The seller agrees to supply a specific number of goods to the buyer, at an agreed 
upon date, in exchange for a specific amount of compensation. The quantity of goods, 
date of exchange, and amount of compensation are legally enforceable aspects of a 
contract. They are the observable events stated in the contract. If either party reneges on 
those aspects of the arrangement, the other party may seek legal retribution. 
 
However, there are contracts or aspects thereof that are not enforceable in a court 
of law. This can occur for two reasons. Either a court of law does not exist or the actions 
of either party are not verifiable in a court of law. Currently, there is no international 
environmental court to uphold biodiversity contracts. Either party can renege on the 
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contract without legal retribution in an international environmental court system. Even if 
a court did exist, certain aspects of a contract are not enforceable due to asymmetric 
information. Effort levels of the collector are not legally verifiable, it they are not 
observable. 
 
Problems that necessitate principal-agent contracts arise when there is imperfect 
information regarding the actions of one of the parties. Frequently there is an 
intertemporal aspect to the uncertainty. Payment may be contingent upon the occurrence 
some future event. That occurrence may be partly affected by one party’s imperfectly 
observable characteristics or actions.  If one party has access to information unavailable 
to the other party, the informed party has the ability to act opportunistically either prior to 
the signing of the contract (adverse selection) or after (moral hazard). For example, the 
collector may have access to valuable information regarding its resource supply that it 
does not reveal to the pharmaceutical company prior to signing the contract.  The 
collector then has information relevant to the outcome that the pharmaceutical company 
does not, and may use that information strategically. Alternatively, the pharmaceutical 
company cannot verify the amount of effort exerted by the collector in obtaining the 
samples. The collector can choose to be lazy after the contract is signed. 
 
Contract theory examines the principal-agent problem that arises when 
information is asymmetric. This theory defines a principal as "an employer that sets a 
compensation rule to motivate an agent to choose activities advantageous to the 
principal" (Parkin and Bade, 1991, p. 423). The agent is the "person hired by a principal 
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to perform various activities" (Parkin and Bade,1991, p. 423). The principal is affected by 
the agent's behavior, and must either monitor that behavior, or choose a compensation 
rule to induce the agent to behave in a particular manner. Since monitoring is often 
costly, choosing  incentive compatible compensation rules is important. The duration of 
the contract and the likelihood for contract renewal can affect the optimal design of a 
contract. Short-term contracts that relate to onetime transactions are less likely to 
encourage high effort levels from the agent than longer-term arrangements. Even in 
longer-term arrangements, the expectation of contract renewal, or lack thereof, can affect 
an agent's behavior. If an agent does not expect the terms of the contract to be renewed 
and/ or renegotiated upon expiration, the agent may exert less effort than he would have 
if he expected his current performance to affect future arrangements. The risk preferences 
of the principal and the agent  must also be take into consideration in the design of the 
contract. (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1989). 
 
Whether the problem is one of moral hazard, adverse selection, monitoring costs, 
expectations of contract renewal, aversion to risk, or a combination thereof, an efficient 
compensation scheme must be designed to induce the desired behavior. An optimal 
compensation rule must satisfy two conditions. First, it must maximize the expected 
profit of the principal. Since the principal is not directly able to force the agent to 
maximize the expected profit of the principal, the principal must indirectly induce the 
agent to behave as desired through the appropriate choice of the incentive payment. The 
second condition that must be satisfied is that the agent must agree to the terms of the 
compensation rule. The agent must be no worse off than he would have been had he 
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chosen an alternative arrangement with another principal, or had he chosen not to 
participate at all. This requirement is the agent's participation constraint. As the principal, 
too, must receive at least her reservation utility, the incentive scheme must ensure that 
both the principal and the agent attain a certain level of utility in order for the scheme to 
be effective (Parkin and Bade, 1991). In some cases it is not possible to attain the first-
best compensation rule because of the constraints of a particular problem. In these cases, 
the second-best rules must be used.v 
  
Consider a relationship between a principal and an agent. The principal, in this 
case, shall be the pharmaceutical company. The agent is the collector country. Assume 
risk neutrality for the principal and risk aversion for the agent. The principal is trying to 
design a contract to offer the agent. The principal has several objectives that she would 
like to induce the agent to accomplish in order to maximize her discounted profits. First, 
she wants the agent to supply a specific number and type of samples, e, to the principal at 
price P. The principal realizes that the quantity and quality of current and future samples 
depend upon both the stock of the biological resources (the rainforest ecosystem), and the 
stock of the genetic information that is available. For this reason, her second objective is 
to induce the agent to increase the stock of genetic information in the samples he screens. 
This stock, G, is built up as the agent screens and identifies samples. The third objective 
is to induce the agent to undertake conservation measures, I, in order to ensure that a 
potential disease-curing sample is not lost due to destruction of the biological stock. This 
is to say that the principal wants to ensure that a certain level of natural biological stock, 
Z, is maintained.  
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Assume that the principal can pay the agent in three forms: an advanced payment,  
a+Φ(G, Z), a price per sample, P, and/or a royalty rate, α. The principal has the ability to 
choose the levels of any of these payments. Let Φ(G, Z) be the portion of the advance 
payment which is a function of G and Z, whereas a is the portion that provides the 
flexibility to ensure that the agent receives exactly his reservation utility. Price, P, is a 
flat, per sample fee, and α is the royalty rate chosen by the principal and paid to the agent 
out of the profits from any products developed.  
 
Let V be the exogenous probability that a product will be developed from a given 
sample. Experts estimate that the probability of successfully developing a pharmaceutical 
product from each sample is one in ten thousand (Roberts, 1992). The principal’s profits, 
R(G,Z), are conditional on the development of a product.vi The assumption is that the 
stocks G and Z affect the quality of the product developed and, therefore, the profit.vii 
The agent is risk neutral and therefore is indifferent between payment schemes. He 
merely wants to maximize his own utility. 
 
The agent incurs the costs of extracting and processing each sample, C (e). 
Assume that for each sample extracted and processed by the agent, one unit of effort is 
exerted, such that effort levels and sample quantities are interchangeable. The agent also 
incurs the costs of investing his resources to conserve the physical stock of samples, the 
tropical forest. These costs are denoted K(I).  It is assumed that Ce>0, KI>0,viii  
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The Risk Averse Agent 
 The problems of the agent and the principal are cast in the dynamic framework of 
a renewable contract through the use of the Hamiltonian. The Hamiltonian function can 
be interpreted as a performance indicator at time t. It is the sum of two terms of current 
profits and the value of net investments. First, consider the agent's problem, which is to 
maximize its Hamiltonian, A. The agent is assumed to have a utility function U (x), where 
x>0 is net income, such that Ux>0, and –Uxx >0. With –Uxx/Ux>0 and –xUxx/Ux>0 risk 
aversion is exhibited by Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute and relative risk aversion 
(Hey, 1979, pp. 48-49).   Let the superscripts H, L and E denote the income level 
associated with high, low, and expected payoff levels respectively. Let UxE =1 be the 
marginal utility from the expected income, Then the marginal utility associated with the 
income received when the agent receives a higher payoff is UxH <1, and the marginal 
utility associated with the income received when the agent receives a low payoff is 
UxL>1.   
 
The agent maximizes:  
 
Setting the partial derivatives of A with respect to I and e equal to zero, the first 
order conditions for a maximum are: 
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Rearranging (2) equation (4) is obtained. It says that for the last unit of I, the 
marginal benefit equals the marginal cost in equilibrium. 
 
For a risk neutral agent (4) would have been z =KI.   
Rearranging (3), equation (5) can be obtained.  
 
With a risk neutral agent (5) would reduce to Ce –P- VαR (G, Z) = g.  
  The adjoint equations of the risk averse agent can be derived as: 
 
The comparable conditions for a risk neutral agent are: 
  
Assuming the steady state, one can solve for the agent’s choice of I. From the 
agent's model, solving (4) for z and substituting this value into (7) gives:  
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For the risk neutral agent (10) would have been: 
  (11)                                                                 )( ZZI RVerK αδ +Φ=+  
From Ux>0 and -Uxx>0, it follows that UxL>UxH and that UxL/ UxH> 1. Hence, 
UxH/[V UxH H /[V UxH +(1-V)UxL=1/[V+(1-V)( UxL/ UxH )] in (10), must be less than 1 
implying that the risk averse agent will invest less than the risk neutral agent. 
 
Simiarily, assuming a steady state, the agent’s choice of e can be derived. From 
the agent's model, substitute (3) into (6) to obtain: 
 
With a risk neutral agent (12) would have been reduced to: 
 
As the right hand side of (13) is smaller than the right hand side of (12), the risk 
averse agent exerts less effort than the risk neutral agent. 
 
The Risk Neutral Principal 
 
For the principal, the profit function must include the participation constraint of 
the agent, and the incentive compatibility constraints. The latter are derived from the 
maximum and adjoint conditions for the agent. The principal  must choose the incentive 
scheme such that those conditions are satisfied. However, the incentive compatibility 
constraint need not be binding.  Assuming these constraints are non-binding, their 
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multipliers are zero, and they can be ignored in the principal’s first order conditions. 
 
In the case of the principal it is the participation constraint of the agent that is 
binding. The principal must provide a payment scheme to the agent such that his 
reservation level of utility, U0, is attained. Since risk has been introduced into this model, 
the participation constraint compares the agent's expected utility with the reservation 
utility, U0. The principal must provide a payment scheme such that the reservation level 
of utility is achieved. In order to do this, she must take into account the agent's 
preferences for risk. The principal's problem, given a risk averse agent, becomes: 
 
With  γI, γe,  γG, and γZ equal to zero, the principal’s first order conditions are: 
 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]{ }
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] [ ]IZeG
zzrUVReVU
ggrUVReVU
gCPUVCPZGRVU
zKUVKVU
PeZGaZGRVeMaxQ
Z
L
xZZ
H
xZ
G
L
xGG
H
x
e
H
xe
H
xe
I
L
xI
H
xI
+−++−+
++−Φ−++Φ+
++−Φ−++Φ+
−−−−−−+
−−++




−−−++−+
−−+++
−Φ−−−=
δψεη
δαγ
εαγ
αγ
γ
α
α
              
)()1()(              
)()1()(              
)()1()(),(              
)1(              
UK(I)C(e)PeZ)Φ(G,aV)U(1
K(I)C(e)Z)R(G,ePeZ)Φ(G,aVU
θ              
(14)                                                    ),(),()1(
G
o
L
H
&
&
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]{ } (17)                       0  )),( )()1(       
),()1(
(16)                                                            0)1(
(15)                                                                  0)1(1
=++−−++
−−=∂
∂
=+−+−=∂
∂
=−++−=∂
∂
ηαθ
α
ψθ
θ
ZGRVUCPUVVU
PZGRV
e
Q
KUVVU
I
Q
UVVU
a
Q
H
ze
L
z
H
z
I
L
z
H
z
L
x
H
x
 19
 In the agent's problem the multiplier of the participation constraint equaled zero, 
whereas for the principal the multiplier, θ=1/[VUxH+(1- V)UxL], is greater than zero. 
Substituting (15) into (16) and (17) simplifies them to (18) and (19) respectively.  
   
The adjoint equations are: 
 
Assuming the steady state, one can solve for the conditions that determine the 
principal’s choices of I and e.  From (18) and (21),  (22) can be derived. 
 
  With a risk neutral agent this would reduce to (23) 
 
Equation (22) implies a lower investment level than does (23). 
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From (19) and (20) the principal’s choice of e is determined by: 
 
 With a risk neutral agent (24) becomes (25). 
 
  With a smaller right hand side, equation (24 implies a lower effort than does (25). 
  
The Optimal Levels Investment and Effort  
 
Now consider the optimal levels for investment and effort. In order to obtain the 
optimal level of investment, the principal must ensure that, at the principal's optimal 
effort level, the agent sees the same marginal benefit from his effort as does the principal. 
In addition any risk must be efficiently allocated. Begin by setting the right hand sides of 
(10) and (22) equal. 
 
If the agent is risk neutral (26) will become: 
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If the agent is risk neutral, and it is possible to set Φ(G, Z) such that Φz=VeRz then 
the principal has many payment options which would yield the optimal level of 
investment. Even if it is not possible to set Φ(G, Z) such that Φz=VeRz, it is still possible 
to obtain the optimal level of effort by setting α =1. 
 
However, if the agent is risk averse, the principal must insure the agent against the 
risk associated with the royalty payment and provide incentive compatible payment 
mechanisms for the agent. The principal can insure the agent by setting α=0, and using 
the up-front payment option Φ(G, Z) to provide incentives by setting Φz=VeRz. However, 
this implies that VeR(G, Z) and VeRz must be estimable. It must be possible to observe 
how expected net revenue varies with Z and G. 
  
 Now consider the optimal level of effort. Set the right hand sides of (12) and (24) 
equal. This gives: 
 
 With a risk neutral agent this reduces to: 
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For a risk neutral agent, there are number of possible payment options the 
principal can.  If  α=0, there is no royalty, the up-front payment, Φ(G, Z), and the sample 
price, P, must be chosen so that ΦG+(r+ε)P= VeRG+(r+ε)VR(G, Z). If  α=1, then 
ΦG+(r+ε)P=0. There is no up-front incentive payment or per sample payment. If 0<α<1, 
there will be an up-front incentive payment, a per sample payment, and a royalty. But, 
given the option of using only the royalty payment, it is straightforward to provide the 
incentive for the optimal level of effort.  
 
As Figure 1 shows, this result is quite different if the agent is risk averse. 
Assuming 0<α<1, let the intercept of the risk neutral and risk averse agent’s marginal 
benefit curves be A and A’. Let the slopes be B and B’ respectively. Let the intercept and 
slope terms for the principal’s marginal benefit curves be Γ and β with and risk neutral 
agent and Γ ’ and β’ with a risk averse agent. Finally let A’’ be the optimal marginal 
benefit level. When risk is introduced, both the principal and the agent's marginal benefit 
curves are affected in two ways. For both parties, the slope term and the intercept term 
are smaller in the risk averse case than in the risk neutral case. The reason for this change 
can be understood by examining the principal and the agent separately. For the risk 
averse agent, the marginal value of the conditional future payments will be smaller 
because the royalty payment is not guaranteed. The uncertainty associated with the 
royalty will reduce its marginal value to the agent.   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 23
  
The marginal benefit of the principal is reduced by the risk averse agent. Her 
profit function is dependent upon the utility that the agent receives and the action that he 
chooses to take accordingly. A smaller exertion of effort will yield a smaller amount of 
genetic information learned, G. The principal's profits are dependent, by definition, upon 
the quantity of genetic information available. Since the level of G will be smaller in the 
risk averse case, the principal's profits will subsequently be smaller than they would be if 
the agent was risk neutral. 
 
With a risk averse agent and a risk neutral principal, the principal can absorb the 
agent's risk by setting α = 0, and putting all of the payment to the agent into a 
combination of the up-front incentive component, Φ(G, Z), and the per sample 
component, P, such that ΦG+(r+e)P=VeRG +(r+ε)VR(G, Z).  If R(G, Z) and its 
determinants are observed by the principal, this will be the most efficient method of 
payment. The fact that Φ(G, Z) is adjusted as Z and G vary gives the necessary incentives 
for the agent's effort, e*, and investment, I*. If P is not fixed through time, but varies 
according to expected revenue, additional flexibility in the payment structure is provided.  
 
Past revenue and effort are likely observable. However, if the levels of G and Z 
are not observable, it will be more difficult to set Φ(G, Z) at the correct level.  Recall that 
the optimal level of effort and the optimal level of investment must be achieved 
simultaneously.  For this reason, the principal is not able to use the per sample payment 
alone, as this would not achieve the optimal level of investment.  When α = 0 in the 
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payment condition for the optimal level of investment for both a risk averse and a risk 
neutral agent, ΦZ =VeRZ. VeRZ is the marginal expected profit from the last unit of Z. V is 
a probability which may be estimated from past experience. However, the marginal 
profit, e RZ, occurs only if a product is successfully developed. It may not be possible to 
estimate this correctly and provide the appropriate incentive effects.  If this cannot be 
accomplished, and Φ(G, Z) is treated simply as a fixed, up-front payment (like a), then 
the principal faces a tradeoff between absorbing the agent's risk and providing an 
incentive compatible payment mechanism.ix   
 
IV. THE LEGAL MODEL 
 
Environmentalists and attorneys have established a general framework of the 
concessions that should be included in the agreement. This framework is referred to as 
the Legal Model. Table 1 compares the compensation forms provided for in the economic 
model and the legal model.  Some differences can be attributed to variations in 
definitions, while some are real divergences between the two models. The legal model 
provides for several types of remuneration, both monetary and nonmonetary. These 
include advance fees, per sample fees, royalties, and technology transfers. According to 
the legal  model, all types of compensation should be specified in the original contract.  
But, not all types of compensation need be paid in any particular case.  This is also true 
for the economic model.  
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Table 2 shows four types of contracts found to be in current use. These are the 
INBio/Merck contract, Biotics contracts, Shaman Pharmaceuticals contracts, and 
agreements supported by the International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups (ICBG) 
Program.  
[Table 1 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In the case of the INBio/Merck contract, the National Biodiversity Institute of 
Costa Rica (INBio) serves as the agent for the country. INBio  is a private, nonprofit 
institution, closely tied to the Costa Rican government’s Ministry of Environment and 
Energy (MINAE). MINAE has created and administers a system of Conservation Areas, 
containing about twenty-five percent of Costa Rica’s land area as protected wild-lands.  
INBio is in the process of inventorying Costa Rica’s biodiversity and involves local 
communities in that process.   INBio as also entered into a bioprospecting contract with 
pharmaceutical firm Merck & Co. In this contract INBio agreed to supply samples for 
pharmaceutical screening over a two-year period in return for one million dollars, a share 
of potential royalties, and technology transfer to develop local sample preparation and 
screening capabilities.  INBio invests ten percent of any payments and half of any 
royalties into the Conservation Areas. 
 
Biotics Ltd.  is a private company which plays and intermediary role between 
pharmaceutical companies and the suppliers of plant samples from developing countries. 
Its bioprospecting activities with were initially funded through the European 
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Community’s initiative on biotechnology (Aylward, 1995). Suppliers receive an initial 
payment of   twenty-five  pounds and fifty percent of any royalties obtained by Biotics. 
Biotics attempts to include in the contract a requirement that a share of the royalties paid 
to the collector be contributed to development or biodiversity projects in the country. 
Buyers are granted a six-month or longer periods of exclusivity, which sellers must 
honor.  
 
With the aim of a more profitable discoveries, Shaman Pharmaceuticals has taken 
the strategy of actively using indigenous ethnobotanical knowledge. Shaman devotes 
twenty percent of its field research budget to financing local projects proposed by the 
local people (e.g. clean water systems). Shaman also invests in building up the local 
infrastructure for supplying  plants.  A percentage of royalties is to be distributed among 
the indigenous people. 
 
The ICBG Program was established by four US agencies, the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation and the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID). The idea was to build a partnership between science and industry 
in the United States and the host country. There are currently five projects which cost 
about $500,000 (Report of Panel, 1997). 
 
An example of an ICBG project is the Suriname Project. Suriname has no formal 
institution like INBio. However, it has a formal agreement in which the Conservation 
International and the Missouri Botanical Garden are to conduct a national biodiversity 
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inventory. A local pharmaceutical company conducts extraction, and initial screening of 
samples. Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS) Pharmaceuticals has agreed to provide training 
and equipment to the local pharmaceutical company. Samples are provided to BMS. An 
agreed upon share of the royalties are to be returned to Suriname. Half of the returned 
royalties are to go to Suriname University, the Suriname Government, and the local 
pharmaceutical company. The other half go into the ‘Forest People’s Fund’ for the 
indigenous people of Suriname. Shamans and other sources of traditional knowledge are 
eligible to hold joint patent rights with a pharmaceutical partner (Conservation 
International, 1997).x 
 
Advance Payments 
 
Both the legal and the economic models provide for advance payments. The legal 
model calls for an advanced payment "to initiate the agreed-upon work-plan"(Downes, et. 
al., 1993, p. 260). It specifies that the advanced payment should be used to cover 
operation and conservation costs (Laird, 1993). This coincides with the economic model. 
A slight variation on the specification of the economic model would allow the up-front 
payment to include expected sample fees, with an adjustment after actual effort is 
observed. Let the up-front payment be [a+Pe*+Φ(G, Z)], where (a+ Pe*), is the portion 
of the advanced payment that could be used to cover operation costs. This includes a 
fixed payment, a, plus the price for the expected level of effort, Pe*.  The second part of 
the advanced payment, Φ(G, Z), is the portion which could be used to cover conservation 
costs. If  Φ(G, Z) is a function with ΦZ> 0, ΦG > 0, ΦZZ < 0, and ΦGG< 0, the less 
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established the collector and the more threatened the natural resources, the smaller is 
Φ(G, Z) but the more it will increase with increases in G and Z.  The payment for actual 
observed effort would be P(e-e*).  
 
Advanced payments ensure collectors of reimbursement, regardless of whether a 
successful discovery results, removing the risk to the collecting country by providing 
income security to the collectors. According to Rubin and Fish (1994), this security will 
facilitate validation of the potential of the biodiversity industry to the source country's 
government, and provide an incentive to improve the regulation of its natural resources. 
 
Three of the contract types include an up-front payment, with some provision for 
investment in conservation efforts. Biotics is the exception. Shaman’s approach of 
financing locally recommended projects and investing in building up the local 
infrastructure for the supply of raw plant material are effectively up-front payments of 
this type. ICBG’s initial investments in the establishment of biodiversity inventories, and 
shaman apprentice programs for local indigenous groups, are similar examples. 
 
Merck & Co. Inc. has committed to a more than one million-dollar payment that 
provides for sample fees plus financial assistance to improve the collection facility and 
conservation measures. They describe it as a payment to "help to get the operation 
moving" (Albers-Schönberg, 1992, p.11).  The remuneration is disbursed in two 
payments; the first is given at the beginning of the agreement, prior to any collection, and 
the second is given one year from the signing of the agreement. The structure of the first 
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payment is the same as the advance payment of both models, where a = A - Pe* is the 
portion to improve the collection facility, and Φ(G,Z) is to improve conservation 
measures.  
 
It should be noted that the portion of the payment that is directed toward 
conservation is connected to inputs to build up G and Z, rather than being based on 
observation of G and Z. This may simply reflect the fact that G and Z are not accurately 
observable. The economic model acknowledged that Φ(G,Z) may be set equal to zero 
when G and Z are not observable.  An alternative approach in that case is to designate a 
portion of the fixed payment to be earmarked for conservation programs in the host 
country. The payment is connected to the input, investment, since that can be observed.  
While this approach does not provide the same incentives as does Φ(G,Z), it may be 
useful in the absence of sufficient information to specify Φ(G,Z).  
 
There is a view that nothing beyond expected sample fees would be included in 
the advance payment. According to researchers at BMS, it seems unlikely that many 
companies would even consider making a heavy financial investment beyond the sample 
fees (Laird, 1993). This is a natural reaction if little information is available about G and 
Z, and if there are no easy ways to direct the up-front payment toward investments in G 
and Z.  However, intermediaries can assist in providing information about G and Z.  
INBio was created by a small group of entomologists who had discovered the wealth of 
information located in the tropical forests of Costa Rica. Initially, their goals were to 
conserve and catalogue all of the genetic resources located in the developing country. The 
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entomologists approached Merck to request a grant to fund their project. Merck had been 
unaware of the magnitude of genetic information located in Costa Rica's forests until the 
entomologists informed them of their findings.   This may also explain the roll of the US 
Government funded ICBG Program. ICBG has taken the role of the intermediary in its 
projects, making the up-front payment, and investing in G and Z.  This makes companies 
like BMS more willing to participate.  
 
Sample Fees 
 
Both the legal and economic models call for per sample fees to be paid to the 
agent by the principal. In the legal model, the payment of sample fees occurs via an 
annual payment. If the advance payment included the expected sample fees, Pe*. then the 
sample fee payment is P(e-e*). This payment is merely the balance due on the samples 
received. It reflects the difference between the actual and the expected effort levels. It 
will be positive if the agent exerted more effort than was expected, and it will be negative 
(a refund to the principal) if the agent's effort was inadequate.  
 
Biotics  and Merck pay sample fees. Biotics’ sample  is a straightforward twenty-
five pounds per sample.  As reported above, Merck & Co. Inc. has committed to a two-
part payment includes sample fees. The second part of the payment is the same as the 
sample fee of both models. This is the payment P(e-e*), which is dependant upon the 
observed efforts of the collector.  
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Royalties to the Collector and/or the Royalties for the Information Provider 
 
Both the economic and the legal model provide for royalty payments to be paid to 
the collecting group should a product be developed from one of the samples that the 
collector provided. The legal model suggests that the value of the royalty should be based 
upon the preferences of the parties involved and the degree of contribution to the final 
product. It also acknowledges that an inverse relationship typically exists between the 
royalty rate and the other payments (Laird, 1993). In the economic model, the royalty 
payment was denoted VeαR(G,Z). The agent's level of effort, e, or degree of contribution 
to the final product, is included in this royalty payment. Lower levels of e will yield 
lower royalty payments, and conversely, higher levels of e will yield higher royalty 
payments. 
According to the legal model, there is another type of royalty rate that should be 
included in the biodiversity-prospecting contract. This is a payment made to the 
contributors of any ethnobotanical information that may have led to the product 
development. In the economic model, the provider of botanical samples and 
ethnobotanical information are defined to be one agent performing both functions. This 
can be viewed as the effort variable being composed of two parts, the ethnobotanical 
information and the actual samples. Samples are not valuable unless there is 
ethnobotanical information. This is incorporated this by having effort contribute to the 
stock of information, G. If a payment per sample is used as part of the payment structure, 
that payment will be set according to the expected revenue generated from the sample, 
which is itself related to G. 
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All of the contracts examined include payment of royalties. Estimates put the 
royalty rate that Merck has promised to INBio between one and five percent (Roberts, 
1992). In its contracts, Biotics promises to pay the collector fifty percent of any royalties 
it receives (Aylward, 1995). ICBG projects have an agreed upon share of royalties to the 
collector, as well as a provision for patents rights to be shared with sources of indigenous 
knowledge.xi Shaman Pharmaceuticals has committed to pay royalties to collectors as 
well as supplies of indigenous knowledge, making little distinction between the two. xii 
 
Technology Transfer  
 
The legal model provides for technology transfer. Such provisions serve to 
permanently enhance the knowledge base and advance the technological development of 
the developing country. The developing economy will benefit overall from a better 
educated, and potentially more productive, population. Technology transfer can also be 
focussed on the bioprospecting sector, with the aim of producing higher quality samples, 
better genetic information about the samples, and greater supply security.  
 
While technology transfer is not directly addressed in the economic model, the 
advance payment, a+Φ(G, Z), could include a contribution toward technology transfer. 
Transfer of technology not related to an effective biodiversity-prospecting infrastructure 
would appear in a (e.g. Shaman’s financing of locally recommended projects). 
Technology transfer directly related to the quality of the bioprospecting product would 
appear in Φ(G,Z). This could involve the provision of technical equipment and trained 
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researchers to facilitate the screening process. This type of technology transfer is a way 
of ensuring that investments in Z and G occur.  
 
Part of Merck’s up-front payment is to be used to finance the training of 
scientists, salaries, and collector expenses, office supplies, computers, administration and 
overhead costs (Laird, 1993). Merck provided has also provided "laboratory equipment 
worth an additional US$130,000" to  (Merck, 1993, p. 1).  Shaman has also made a 
commitment to technology transfer programs, such as bringing host country scientists to 
Shaman’s California laboratories, and providing equipment and financial support for 
research in the host country. ICBG projects have a similar commitment to technology 
transfer. ICBG training includes long-term education programs, as well as short technical 
courses and workshops related to biodiversity inventories and science. Equipment for the 
host country is provided both by the corporate partner and through government funding. 
Biotics merely attempts negotiate contracts which have a share of the royalties going 
toward development in the source country (Aylward, 1995). 
 
Conservation Measures 
 
The final form of compensation prescribed by the legal model is the requirement 
the contribution to national or in-country conservation programs (Downes, et. al., 1993, 
p. 268-270). All of the contracts examined have specifically referred to conservation 
measures in their agreements with the source countries. Biotics, attempts to include a 
provision in the contract with the collector which stipulates a share of the royalties go to 
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“development in the host country or its biodiversity related projects”  (Aylward, 1995,  p, 
116).  Shaman promises to contribute a percentage of all of their profits to the Healing 
Forest Conservancy (Blum, 1993, p. 42-43). Merck has specifically required in its 
contractual agreement that ten percent of the advanced payment and fifty percent of all 
royalties received must be contributed towards conservation efforts. These funds are 
"earmarked for support of biological diversity" (Merck Handout, 1993, p. 3). In the case 
of ICBG, a panel of experts reviewing ICBG projects has reports that in some host 
countries, the ICBG programs have stimulated biodiversity conservation and reduced 
reliance on deforestation and mining activities (Report of a Special Panel of Experts on 
the International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups, 1997). 
 
With respect to the economic model, the designation of funds toward conservation 
is inherent in the payments Φ(G,Z), and VeαR(G,Z). If the contract is a long term one, 
there is a built in incentive for both parties to ensure that the natural biological stock is 
not eliminated, and hence, secure the future supply of samples. However, most contracts, 
specify that portions of the royalties and the up-front payment are to be allocated to 
conservation. With the up-front payment,  Φ(G, Z), this may simply reflect the fact 
that G and Z are not accurately observable Z are not observable. The payment is 
connected to the input, investment, since that can be observed. 
 
 Given that the net revenue from a successful discovery is directly related to the 
magnitude of G and Z, the economic model states that the royalty payment itself will 
provide an incentive to invest in G and Z. However, with a risk averse agent the level of 
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investment will be too low. Hence,  there may be a reason for the principal to explicitly 
regulate the level of investment in G and Z. 
 
Conclusions                                                                                                                                              
 
Considerable work has gone into the development of biodiversity contracts. The 
contracts developed roughly reflect the character of the economic model developed in 
this paper. Although it is quite likely that host counties are risk averse, and most contracts 
acknowledge this by providing some form of up-front payment, the contracts all include 
some provision for royalties. This implies that the contracts are second-best 
approximations in which the principal faces a tradeoff between absorbing the agent's risk 
and providing an incentive compatible payment mechanism. Hence, the need for contract 
stipulations that earmark payments for conservation, or for the principal to make direct 
investments in training and technology development in the host country.  
 
 
There are intermediaries involved in at lest some of these contracts. In some 
cases, such as those of  INBio and the ICBG projects,  the intermediary has played a large 
role in establishing the contract. Whether or not bioprospecting values constitute a large 
part of the value of biodiversity, the development of such contracts provides a model and 
reduces transaction costs for future contractual arrangements to conserve biodiversity. 
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Table 1:  Types of Compensation Payments 
Compensation Form Economic Model Legal Model 
Advanced Payment Yes Yes 
Sample Fees Yes Yes 
Royalties (for Collectors) Yes Yes 
Royalties (for Shaman)# No Yes 
Technology Transfer Yes Yes 
Contributions for 
Conservation Measures 
Yes Yes 
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Table 2 : Four Contracts 
Compensation INBio/Merck Biotics  Shaman ICGB/ 
Suriname 
Parties INBio, 
MINAE, Merck 
Various Various CI, MBG, BMS 
 
Advance 
Payments 
Monetary No Financing local 
projects 
Inventory of 
Biodiversity 
Sample Fees Yes Yes No No 
Royalties to 
Collectors 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Royalties for 
information 
No No Yes Yes 
Technology 
Transfer 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Funds for 
Conservation 
Yes Maybe Yes Yes 
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APPENDIX: A MODEL OF STOCHASTIC OPTIMAL CONTROL 
 
The previous sections used essentially a Tobit model of expected revenue, with 
the conditional revenue being deterministic with deterministic stock variable arguments, 
R(G, Z). This section models revenue as itself being a stock variable, but one which has a 
stochastic component. R is assumed to be related to the stock variables Z and G, and the 
decay rates of G and Z, in a very simple way R=G+Z. Formally, let the accumulation 
equation for R be: 
   
Where W is Brownian motion, and the revenue increment has an expected mean 
of [-(ε+δ)R+I +e] and a standard deviation of σ(R). The investor is assumed to have 
information on the past values of R, [-(ε+δ)R+I +e], and  σ(R), knowing not only the 
expected revenue, but also the expected mean and standard deviation of revenue 
increments consecutive to any decision she makes. Following the approach of Bismut 
(1975), the agent maximizes: 
 
 H is negative representing risk aversion. The standard deviation σ(R) has positive 
first partial derivatives. With the shadow price for the participation constraint equal to 
zero, the maximum conditions are: 
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The adjoint equation is: 
   
 Assuming a steady state for G and Z, assumes a steady state for R. With a steady 
state, substituting (A4) into (A5) yields the agent’s marginal cost equals marginal benefit 
condition for I: 
   
 
Similarly, substituting (A3) into (A5) yields the agent’s marginal cost equals 
marginal benefit condition for e. 
  
 
With the participation constraints not binding, the principal’s problem is to 
maximize: 
     
 The maximum conditions are: 
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The adjoint equation is:  
   
Assuming a steady state the principal’s marginal cost equals marginal benefit 
equations for I and e are: 
 
For the agent to invest optimally the right hand sides of (A6) and (A12) must be 
equal at the optimal level of investment. 
  
For the optimal level of effort, the right hand sides of (A7) and (A13) must be 
equal. 
 
If the agent was risk neutral, H=0 and (A14) reduces to αe+ΦR= e. The 
condition in (A15 ) reduces to: [P+αR][r+δ+ε]+αe+ΦR=R[r+δ+ε]+e. The optimal 
level of investment and effort could be obtained by setting α=1, ΦR=0, and P=0.   
Alternatively, α could be set equal to zero, with P=R and ΦR=e. More generally, setting 
a between zero and one, ΦR= (1-α)e and P= (1-α)R would allow the risk neutral version 
of (A15) to hold. 
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If the agent is risk averse, then the α=0 option must be chosen if the first-best 
solution is to hold. With α=0, P[r+δ+ε]+ΦR=R[r+δ+ε]+ e. So the principal can absorb 
all of the risk, P must be set equal to R, and the up front payment Φ(R, Z) must be set 
such that ΦR=e. This is exactly the same result as was derived for the previous model as e 
is the equivalent of VeRG in the previous model, and R is the equivalent of VR(G, Z).  
Again it is implied that expected effort and expected revenue be observable. In this model 
it is assumed that RG= RZ=1, but Z and G will have to be observed in order to predict 
expected revenue, R. 
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i  Ex situ conservation can only conserve known materials, and some of these are unsuited to currently 
available techniques for ex situ storage. As ex situ storage stores materials outside their natural habitats and 
isolates them from the natural evolutionary process, there is a potential problem of genetic drift (Frisvold 
and Condon, 1998) 
 
ii Although bioprospecting for materials of pharmaceutical value is the focus of this paper, biodiversity is 
also an important reservoir of robustness for agriculture. However, for crops, the supplies of ex situ 
resources tend to be larger, and establishment of effective property rights more problematic. There is a 
large supply of ex situ germplasm already available in existing gene banks  (e.g. the Consultative Group for 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)). While developing countries would like to have greater 
control over the germplasm they have supplied, for the most part it has been freely exchanged Frisvold and 
Condon, 1998). Biotechnology is poised to produce products that substitute for natural ones.  Already, the 
Bacillus thuringiennsis gene has been used to create pest resistance in crops such as maize (Brush , 1998).  
 
iii The Madagascar Rosey Periwinkle provides an example of what can happen if the country is not able to 
exert any property rights.  In 1958, Gordon H. Svoboda, of Eli Lilly Pharmaceutical Company, tested an 
extract of the rosey periwinkle plant that had been found in the tropical forests of Madagascar.  The 
screening found genetic activity, which implied that this plant possessed the characteristics desirable for 
successful drug development.  Further research was conducted which resulted in the development and 
patenting of two extremely effective anti-cancer drugs.  Within a few years, Eli Lilly began marketing the 
drugs and earned millions of dollars in sales long before the patent expired.  In 1985 alone, sales were 
estimated at $100 million, "88% of which was profit for the company" (Farnsworth, 1988).  As of 1992, Eli 
Lilly had made no payments to Madagascar (Khalil, 1995). More recently some countries 
such as India, have begun to take a much more aggressive approach to defending their property rights. 
See “When Rhetoric Hits Reality in Debate on Bioprospecting” in Nature, Vol. 392, 1998. 
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iv  The Trade-related Intellectual Property Section (TRIPS) of the GATT agreement requires all signatories 
to implement IPR systems for microorganisms, microbiological processes and plant varieties. The problem 
is how to recognition of indigenous, community-based forms of indigenous innovation in an IPR system 
which been developed to reward individual and corporate innovation (Brush, 1998). 
. 
v In a second-best solution, efficiency gains always exist but may not be fully attainable because of 
asymmetric information. If information was symmetric, and actions were observable, the first-best solution 
would be attainable. See Rees, 1987, p. 65. 
 
vi The opportunity cost of all of the principal's inputs, including a return to entrepreneurial talent, is netted 
out of R(G,Z).  An unsuccessful outcome is assumed to yield R(G, Z) = 0, while a successful  outcome will 
yield R(G,Z)> 0.  
 
vii  This assumption says that the stock of biological resources (Z) and the stock of genetic information (G) 
don’t have any influence on the probability of a successful discovery, but they do influence the quality of 
the product discovered and therefore the profitability of the discovery. Successful discoveries will still take 
place at lower levels of Z and G, but they will be less profitable.  In the case of the rosey periwinkle, lower 
values of Z and G would mean that something less profitable would have been discovered. High quality 
genetic stocks mean more knowledge and better products can be found. High quality biological stocks 
mean more diversity and materials that have potential for greater returns can be selected.  
 
viii The convexity of the cost curves ensures the concavity of the agent’s Hamiltonian in the control 
arguments. Sattler and Sung (1993) have shown that for the continuous time problem concavity of the 
Hamiltonian in the control arguments is required for the first-order approach to be used for the principal-
agent problem 
 
ix  This section used a Tobit model of expected revenue, with conditional revenue being deterministic, with 
deterministic arguments, R(G,Z). In the appendix a stochastic optimal control model is used. Revenue is 
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modeled as itself being a stock variable, but one that has a stochastic component. However, the results of 
the stochastic control model are the same as those derived in Section III. 
 
x Other ICBG projects are located in Peru, Costa Rica, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Cameroon and Nigeria. 
Corporate involvement includes the Montsano Company, BMS, Shaman, and American Cyanamid 
(Department of Health and Human Services, 1994). 
 
xi In previous contractual arrangements, Biotics and the National Cancer Institute (NCI) had merely agreed 
to negotiate royalties at the time of product development. They did not guarantee that royalties would be 
paid in the event of product development. Their contractual design has evolved due to the opportunity for 
post contractual opportunistic behavior by either party in the earlier agreements. They have found that by 
specifying the rates in advance, neither party has the ability to exercise leverage over the other at a future 
time (Sedjo and Simpson, 1994). 
 
xii Industry averages for royalty rates to collectors range from one to three percent of the pharmaceutical 
company’s profits from the drugs developed, although some royalty rates have been 
much larger than this average (Laird, 1993). The range is from zero to fifty percent. 
